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1. Introduction
At first glance, reconciling the post-1986 behavior of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the
Tax Reform Act of1986 (TRA86) presents an unusual puzzle. On the one hand, changing the tax
treatment of foreign direct investment, either absolutely or relative to domestic investment, was not
a major theme of TRA86 or the tax reform movement in general. On the other hand, since the act's
passage in 1986, foreign direct investment both into and from the United States has apparently
surged. As Figure 1 shows, the standard measure of inward FDI reached an all-time high of $58.4
billion in 1988. continuing a secular increase that began in the late 1970's. Outward FDI also
reached an all-time high of $44.2 billion in 1987 which, contrary to the case of inward FDI,
represented a sharp turnaround from the situation of the early 1980's. Outward FDI In 1988.
though, fell back to $17.5 billion, which is approximately its level in 1985 and, after adjusting for
capital gains and tax haven transactions, is lower as a fraction of GNP than it was in the late
1970's.
Was tax reform responsible for the surge in FDI. or is the timing of the two events purely a
coincidence? Furthermore, has the mix of Investment, its financing, and its timing been affected
by the tax law change? These are the principal questions addressed by this paper. I conclude that
it is impossible to establish a clear link between tax policy and the aggregate behavior of FDI. both
because the a priori impact of the change is not clear and because it is impossible, with less than
three years of post-TRA86 data, to sort out any tax effect from other influences on FDI. Several
aspects of recent FDI performance are, however, consistent with the effect of TRA86 on
incentives. including the strength of outward PDI to low-tax countries, and the Increase in net
transfers of debt abroad. For Inward FDI, the predominance of investment from Japan and the
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U.K., the relative decline of debt transfers, and the increased reported rate of return on investment
are consistent with tax incentives.
To reach these conclusions, the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the
U.S. tax treatment of FDI. Section 3 discusses the changes wrought by 1RA86 and how they
affected the incentives for the real and financial dceisions of multinational firms. The evidence
about FDI since 1986 is presented in Section 4, and compared to the predictions made in Section 3.
Some concluding comments are offered in Section 3.
2. The Taxation of the Income from Foreign Direct Investment
1.1 An Overview
Each country in the world asserts the right to tax the income that is generated within its
borders, including the income earned by foreign multinational corporations. Countries do,
however, differ widely in the tax rate they apply, the definition of the tax base, and in the special
incentives they offer for investment. Nevertheless, the first and quantitatively most important tax
burden on FDI comes from the government of the country (known as the "host" country) where
the investment is located.
Many countries, including the U.S., Japan, and the United Kingdom also assert the right to
tax the worldwide income of its residents, including its resident corporations. As a rule, the
income of foreign subsidiaries is recognized only upon repatriation of earnings through dividends,
interest, or royalty payments. In order to avoid the potentially onerous burden of two layers of
taxation, those countries that tax on a worldwide basis also offer a credit for income and
withholding taxes paid to foreign governments. The total credit available in any given year is
usually limited to the home country's tax liability on the foreign-source income, although credits
earned in excess of the limitation may often be carried forward or backward to offset excess
limitations for other years. Several other countries, including France and the Netherlands, operate
a "territorial" system of taxing their resident corporations, under which foreign-source business
income is completely exempt from home country taxation. 1
This would be the end of the story if the geographical location of income was not a matter
of dispute. In fact, even if all the information necessary to ascertain the location of income was
costlessly available, the conceptual basis for locating income is controversial (Ault and Dradford.
fothcoming). In reality corporations do not have the incentive to fully reveal all the information on
which to base a determination of the geographical source of income. For any pattern of real
investment dCcisions, a multinational has the incentive to shift the apparent source of income out of
high-tax countries into low-tax countries. This can be accomplished through, for example, the
pricing of intercompany transfers of goods and intangible assets, or doing borrowing through
subsidiaries in high-tax countries. Note that this incentive applies regardless of whether the home
country operates a territorial or worldwide system of taxation.
Much of the complexity of the taxation of foreign-source income arises from the attempt of
countries to defend their revenue base against the fungibility of income tax bases. Complex rules
cover standards for acceptable transfer pricing, allocation rules for interest expense and intangihles.
and taxing on an accrual basis certain types of income. It is impossible to concisely swnma;rize the
variety of rules that countries employ to determine the location of income. In some countries the
statutes are not as important as the outcomes of case-by-case negotiations between representatives
of the multinationals and the countries involved. In other cases the source rules are governed by
bilateral tax treaties. What is clear, however, is that the de facto rules that govern the sourcing of
income are at least as important for understanding the effective taxation of foreign direct investment
as the tax rates, depreciation rules, and tax credits. 2
2.2 The U.S. System of Taxing the Income from Foreign Direct Investment
2.2.1 Outward Investment
The U.S. operates a worldwide system of taxation. Thus both domestic-source and
foreign-source income of U.S. multinationals are subject to U.S. taxation. The income of foreign
subsidiaries3 is not, however, taxed as accrued but instead enters the tax base of the U.S. parent
only upon repatriation of dividends, at which time it is "grossed up" by the average tax rate paid to
I.
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foreign governments. The grossed-up dividends, minus certain expenses of the multinational
allocated to foreign-source income, enter into the taxable income of the parent. Foreign-source
income of the parent also includes interest and royalty payments from subsidiaries and certain types
of "passive" income on an accrual basis, plus the foreign-source income of foreign branch
operations.
In general, income taxes paid by foreign affiliates to foreign governments can be credited
against U.S. tax liability. This credit is, however, limited to the U.S.-tax liability on the foreign-
source income, which is approximately equal to the U.S. statutory corporation tax rate multiplied
by the net foreign-source income of the subsidiary. Multinationals whose potentially creditable
foreign taxes exceed the limitation on credits are said to be in an excess credit position. These
excess credits may be carried forward for five years (or backward for two years) without interest to
be used if and when the parent's potentially creditable taxes fall short of the limitation. If the
potentially creditable taxes are less than the limit on credits to be taken in a given year, the
corporation is said to be in an exeess limitation (or deficit of credit) position. Distinguishing the
excess credit and excess limitation situation is critically important, because the tax-related
incentives for real and financial behavior are often quite different for a corporation depending on
which situation it is in.
3. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Changed Incentives for Foreign Direct
Investment
3.1 Outward Investment
3.1.1 Tax Law Changes
The three most significant aspects of TRA86 for outward investment, in order of
importance, were as follows:
1. The reduction in the statutory corporate rate from 46% to 34%, and the resulting
increase in the number of firms in an excess credit situation,
2. The change in the rules governing the sourcing of income and the allocation of expenses
(most significantly interest) between domestic and foreign-source income, and
3. The tightening of the foreign tax credit limiting the averaging of different types of
income.
3.1.1.1 The Reduced Statutory Corporate Tax Rate
The single most important aspect of TRA86 for outward FDI was the reduction in the
statutory rate of corporation income tax from 46% to 34%. Many of the repercussions of the new
law follow from this change.
To see this, a brief digression on the impact ofTRA86 on domestic investment is required.
It is well known that the net effect of the tax system on the incentive to invest depends not only on
the statutory rate but also on, among other things, the schedule of depreciation allowances, the rate
and scope of investment tax credits, the source of financing, and the rate of inflation. TRA86
eliminated the investment tax credits which previously applied to equipment and machinery, and
provided generally less generous depreciation allowances, both of which tended to offset the tax
rate reduction. Most analysts concluded that the net effect of these provisions was to slightly
increase the effective corporate-level tax on new domestic investment, an important alternative to
FDI.
An analysis of how these same changes affected the effective tax rate on FDI must proceed
quite differently because, with certain exceptions, foreign-source income of foreign subsidiaries
enters the parent's tax base only to the extent that dividends are repatriated. There is thus no
calculation of foreign-source taxable income from which depreciation allowances are deducted and
against which investment tax credits can be offset. The tax base is simply dividends received
minus allocable deductions, grossed up by the average rate of foreign taxation (calculated using an
earnings and profits measure of taxable income, which is not sensitive to legislated changes in the
tax depreciation schedules used for domestically-located assets, investment credits, etc.). To that
base is applied the corporate statutory tax rate.
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Thus, ignoring the source-of-income rules discussed below, the corporate tax changes of
TRA86 reduced the statutory rate from 46% to 34% but did not broaden the tax base, resulting in
an unambiguous reduction in the tax rate on income from FDI. Assuming that the taxes imposed
5by the foreign governments remained unchanged, it follows that the amount of additional taxation
imposed by the U.S. upon repatriation either stayed the same or declined. It stayed at zero for
6multinationals whose average tax rate paid to foreign governments exceeds 46%. Any
multinational subject to an average tax rate by foreign governments between 34% and 46% had
formerly been paying taxes upon repatriation, but under the new rate would no longer be liable for
any additional taxes. For firms paying less than a 34% average tax rate to foreign governments,
the tax due upon repatriation would fall substantially, although not to zero.
The other important implication of the reduction of the U.S. statutory rate from 46% to
34% is that a much higher fraction of U.S. multinationals are likely to be in an excess credit
situation, because the average tax paid to foreign governments exceeds 34%.8 For a firm in excess
credit status, every additional dollar paid in tax to a foreign government generates a foreign tax
credit that cannot be used immediately, and has some value to the multinational only if the firm will
be in an excess limitation position either in the next five years (the carryforward limit) or had been
in an excess limitation position in the previous two years (the carryback limit). Thus a U.S.
multinational in an excess credit position is likely to be much more sensitive to differences in
foreign effective tax rates than a firm in an excess limitation situation. 9 This increases the relative
attractiveness of investment in a low-tax foreign country such as Ireland compared to a high-tax
country such as West Germany.
3.1.1.2 New Source Rules
A firm in excess credit status can reduce the present value of its tax burden to the extent it
can increase the limit on foreign tax credits. This increases the importance of the rules determining
the source, for U.S. tax purposes, of worldwide income. Ilolding worldwide income constant, if
a dollar of income is shifted from domestic-source, to foreign-source, it increases the foreign tax
credit limitation by one dollar and allows 344 more of foreign taxes to be credited immediately
against U.S. tax liability. Only to the extent that foreign governments enforce the same source
rules will there be an offsetting increase in foreign tax liability.
One existing source rule that becomes more important applies to production for export.
According to current regulations, between forty and fifty percent of the income from domestic
U.S. production of export goods can effectively be allocated to foreign-source income. For a
multinational in an excess credit position, this has the effect of reducing the effective tax rate on
domestic investment for export by as much as a half. Thus, if a contemplated FDI is to produce
goods for sale outside the U.S., the alternative of domestic U.S. production has become relatively
tax favored for those firms which have shifted into excess credit status, in spite of the base
- broadening aspects of TRA86. This reasoning would not, though, apply to FDI designed to
reexport to the U.S., because the alternative of domestic production for internal consumption does
not benefit from the export source rule.
Interest expenses of the U.S. parent corporation must be allocated to either U.S. or
foreign-source income. The general rule is to allocate on the basis of the book value of assets, so
that interest expenses deductible from foreign-source income are equal to total interest payments
multiplied by the fraction of worldwide assets represented by assets expected to generate foreign-
source income. Although TRA86 did not significantly alter this allocation formula, it did add a
"one-taxpayer" rule, under which corporations that are members of an affiliated group are
consolidated for the purpose of allocating interest expenses between U.S. and foreign sources.10
In the absence of this rule a multinational could load its debt into a U.S. subsidiary with no
foreign-source income and have the interest expense be allocated entirely to U.S.-source income,
thus maximizing foreigs -source income and the limitation on foreign tax credits. With the one-
taxpayer rule, a fraction of these interest payments has to be allocated to foreign-source income
regardless of the legal structure of the multinational.
For multinationals in excess credit position that are forced to reallocate interest payments.
this provision increases the average cost of capital of domestic or foreign investment to the extent
9
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debt finance is used. It also increases the marginal cost of foreign investment, because foreign
investment increases the amount of interest payments that must be allocated abroad, which
decreases foreign-source income and therefore the amount of foreign taxes that are immediately
creditable.I This provision is obviously most important for multinationals with a high debt-to-
capital ratio.
3.1.1.3 Separate Baskets
TRA86 also changed the operation of the foreign tax credit by creating separate ("basket")
limitations for certain categories of income. Foreign taxes imposed on taxable income in a
particular basket can only offset U.S. taxes due on that category of income. There are eight
separate baskets, including passive income, high withholding tax interest, and financial services
income. In some cases (e.g., passive income), the objective was to prevent fungible income from
being eamed in low-tax rate foreign jurisdictions and thus increasing the amount of available
foreign tax credits that could offset taxes paid on other income to foreign governments. In other
cases (e.g., high withholding tax interest), the objective was to prevent multinationals (often
banks) in an excess limit position from paying effectively high withholding taxes (which, due to
the excess limit, could be immediately credited against U.S. tax liability) in return for favorable
pre-tax terms of exchange (i.e. higher than otherwise pre-tax interest rates on loans). These
objectives share the common thread of limiting the revenue loss to the U.S. than can arise from
manipulation of the foreign tax credit mechanism.
In general, the creation of separate foreign tax credit baskets increases the effective taxation
of foreign-source income, because it makes it more difficult in certain cases to credit foreign
income taxes against U.S. tax liability. In addition, the baskets can add significant complexity to
the typical multinational's compliance procedure, and to this extent the provisions add a hidden tax




3.1.2 The Effect on Outward' FDI
The preceding discussion touched only on the most important provisions of TRA86 that
affect the incentives of U.S. firms to undertake and finance FDI. Because some of the provisions
have offsetting incentive effects, its impact on aggregate outward FDI is unclear on a priori
grounds. Moreover, the net effect of the tax changes depends critically on firm characteristics such
as its excess credit status (which in turn depends on such factors as the countries of operation and
repatriation policy), its debt-capital ratio, and whether foreign production is for re-export to 
the
U.S. or for sale abroad.
Before the actual impact of TRA86 could be discerned, Grubert and Mutti (1987) attempted
a quantitative assessment of its impact on FDI using a two-country, multi-sectoral general
equilibrium model. To quantify the changes in U.S. corporate taxation of foreign-source income,
they relied on the revenue estimates that accompanied 'IRA86. Netting the tax increases on foreign
income (due primarily to the new interest allocation rules and separate foreign tax credit
limitations), estimated to be $2.9 billion, against the reduction in U.S. tax qn foreign corporate
income due to the statutory rate reduction, estimated at $3.2 billion, yielded a tax reduction on
foreign-source income of 0.3 percentage points. Thus on net they judged that TRA86 provided a
slight reduction in the tax on foreign-source income and a moderate increase in the corporate tax on
domestic investment, and concluded that TRA86 would have a relatively small impact on capital
flows and the trade balance. For the short run they forecast a capital outflow in response to lower
after-tax returns in the U.S., and an accompanying decrease in the trade deficit. In the long run
output in the import-competing sector was predicted to decline by between one and two percent due
to the relatively large increase in that sector's capital costs, the tax incentives to exports, and the
outflow of capital.
In a similar vein, Sinn (1988) argued that TRA86 would result in a net outflow of direct
investment. As in the Gubert and Mutti analysis, this conclusion is based on the judgment that the
base broadening aspects of corporate taxation slightly outweighed the reductions in the statutory
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rate cut, and thus increased the effective rate of taxation on domestic U.S. investment. Sinn also
argued that'TRA86's changes in the individual-level taxation of capital income would reinforce this
conclusion. The cuts in marginal tax rates, by raising the after-tax return on financial assets, and
the increased effective tax rate on capital gains would combine to raise the required rate of return to
U.S. investors, who hold claims on predominantly U.S.-located real capital.
Although the impact on aggregate FDI is unclear on a priori grounds, as mentioned above
investment in high-tax countries such as Germany should decrease compared to investment in low-
tax countries such as Ireland. This is because the increased prevalence of firms in an excess credit
position implies that incremental foreign-source income from Germany will often no longer
generate offsetting foreign credits.
TRA86 also has implications for the financial and accounting decisions of multinationals,
holding constant their real investment decisions. The relatively low U.S. statutory rate makes it
attractive to have interest deductions taken against subsidiaries' income subject to tax by foreign
governments. A movement toward this financial structure, depending on how it is structured,
could show up in the data as transfers of debt capital from U.S. parent to its foreign affiliates and
an offsetting transfer of equity from the affiliate to the U.S. parent.
1 2
More generally, the relatively low U.S. statutory rate provides multinationals with the
incentive to reduce taxable income subject to foreign taxes, even if there is a corresponding
increase in U.S. source income for U.S. tax purposes. There are a host of techniques
multinationals can use to achieve this purpose, including receiving income from foreign
subsidiaries via payments deductible from host country taxable income (e.g., interest, royalties,
and service fees) and the pricing of intrafinn transfers of goods and services. To the extent that
this happens we would expect foreign-source income to decrease, which could show up in the data
as a decreased rate of return on foreign investment.'
3
Because of the gradual reduction of the corporate tax rate (from 46% in 1986 to 40% in
1987 to 34% in 1988 and subsequent years), many multinationals had an incentive to postpone
dividend repatriations from 1986 and 1987 into 1988 and beyond. Thus the dividend payment rate
should be abnormally low in late 1986 and 1987, and abnormally high in 1988. This would
increase measured undistributed earnings of foreign affiliates in 1986 and 1987 and reduce them in
1988.
Whether the rate of profit repatriation will be permanently affected is a distinct and
interesting question. Lowering the U.S. corporation tax rate will generally reduce the amount of
tax paid to the U.S. government upon repatriation. However, lartman (1984) has persuasively
argued that the amount of tax due upon repatriation should not affect a firm's choice of whether to
repatriate or invest a dollar of its earnings, because the repatriation tax reduces equally both the
return and the opportunity cost of investment. In other words, the repatriation tax reduces equally
the parent's after-tax return from a dividend today and a dividend in the future, and thus does not
affect the optimal timing of dividends. If, though, the current tax rate on repatriations is expected
to increase over time, Hartman's reasoning would imply an incentive for current repatriations
because the tax system reduces the after-tax return to investing earnings (and future repatriation)
more than it reduces the opportunity cost (current repatriation).
3.2 Inward Investment
3.2.1 Tax Law Changes
Foreign corporations, and U.S. corporations controlled by a foreign corporation, that are
engaged in a trade or business in the U.S. are subject to taxation according to rules that are roughly
comparable to those that apply to U.S. corporations. Thus, the reduction of the statutory rate,
elimination of the investment tax credit, and changes in depreciation schedules apply directly to
foreign subsidiaries. The U.S. also imposes a "withholding" tax of 30 percent, modified by treaty
to a much lower figure for many countries, on payments from corporations within the U.S. to
foreign corporations. These withholding tax rates were not affected by TRA86.
TRA86 did introduce a new branch profits tax, which imposes a 30 percent tax (often
reduced by treaty) on the repatriated profits and certain interest payments of a U.S. branch of a
foreign corporation. This tax, which affects primarily financial institutions, was designed to
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equalize the tax treatment of foreign corporations operating through a U.S. branch and those
operating through a wholly owned domestic subsidiary.
3.2.2 The Effect on Inward FDI
The conclusion of many observers that TRA86 increased the effective rate of taxation on
new corporate investment dominated the forecasts about inward FDI made by those few brave
souls who offered a prediction before the actual impact could be discerned. Both Gruben and
Mitti (1987) and Sinn (1988) based their conclusions that inward FDI would fall on this aspect of
TRA86.
After observing the surge of inward FDI to the U.S. immediately after the passage of
TRA86. Scholes and Wolfson (1989) offered an ingenious argument that the increase in the
effective tax rate on domestically-located capital was a key element in the sharp increase of inward
FDI. Their argument begins (as does the argument of Grubert-Mutti and Sinn) with the
presumption that TRA86 increased the effective rate of taxation on domestically-located capital.
Now consider a foreign firm resident in a country which taxes on the basis of worldwide income
and offers a tax credit for income taxes paid to foreign governments. If the U.S. average tax rate is
below the foreign statutory rate, and ignoring the benefits of deferral, the total effective tax rate on
a U.S. investment will be unchanged by the increase in the U.S. effective tax rate. To putit
another way, the increased U.S. taxation is offset by increased credits offered by the foreign
government. If the total effective tax rate faced by foreigners stays unchanged, when the tax rate
faced by U.S. investors increases, the relative tax rate of foreigners declines, causing a shift in
ownership of U.S.-located assets to foreign corporations. Thus the counterintuitive prediction of
this analysis is that increases in U.S. corporate taxation will increase foreign ownership of U.S.-
located capital. The Scholes-Wolfson hypothesis bears further discussion because of its startling
predictions, its ability to apparently explain some of the post-TRA86 data (discussed below), and
because it offers a convenient organizing focus for thinking about the effect of U.S. tax law on
inward FDI.
The analysis rests on two assumptions which are subject to some qualification. First, of
the six principal countries exporting capital to the U.S., only two (Japan and the United Kingdom)
operate a worldwide system with foreign tax credit. France and the Netherlands operate a
territorial system, so that foreign-source income of their resident multinationals is untaxed by the
home country. Although Canada and West Germany in theory have a worldwide system, by treaty
- with the U.S. repatriated dividends bear no further taxation. For multinationals in these latter four
countries, the effective tax rate on FDI in the U.S. is no different than for U.S. companies, so that
the analysis does not apply. Japan and the U.K. have, however, accounted for slightly more than
half of the six countries' FDI in the U.S. in the past several years. Nevertheless, the assumption
that the investing country operates a worldwide system of taxation does not apply universally.
Furthermore, even for Japan and the U.K., TRA86 did not increase the tax rate on U.S. F)I only
to the extent the multinationals are in an excess limitation position and are repatriating income that
is subject to additional taxation in the home country. If most income is retained by the U.S.
subsidiaries, then the U.S. tax rate is the relevant one for all investors and an increase does not
reduce the relative tax rate faced by Japanese or U.K. investors.
Second, the Scholes-Wolfson hypothesis says that an increase in U.S. corporate taxation
reduces the relative tax burden on foreign-owned investment, but certainly does not imply a decline
in the absolute level of taxation. Thus the hypothesis suggests a change in the ownership pattem
of existing capital, but is consistent with a decline in the rate of increase of foreign-owned capital
due to the heavier absolute tax burden imposed by TRA86.
Some of the changed incentives for financial behavior that apply to U.S. multinationals also
apply to foreign multinationals operating in the U.S. The relatively low U.S. statutory rate makes
it attractive to shift taxable income to a U.S. jurisdiction, either by shifting debt out of U.S.
corporations or via transfer pricing. There is no change, though, in the incentives for dividend
repatriation.
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4. FDI Since TRA86
4.1 Outward Investment
The usual measure of outward FDI surged immediately following the passage of TRA86.
As Figure 2 shows, the flow of outward FDI reached an all-time high of $44.5 billion in 1987,
continuing a secular increase that began in 1983, and representing a sharp turnaround from the
situation of the early 1980's. As recently as 1984, outward FDI was only $2.8 billion, and it
averaged less than $1 billion for the 1982-4 period. In 1988, though, outward FDI fell from $44.2
billion back down to $17.5 billion, below both the 1985 and 1986 levels but still significantly
higher than in the 1981-4 period. 14
Figure 2 also shows that the 1987 increase in outward investment was almost entirely
comprised of an increase in retained earnings, with net transfers of debt plus equity contributing
very little to the total. Similarly, the 1988 drop was largely due to a decline in retained eamings.
Furthermore, a substantial fraction of the 1987 increase and 1988 decrease in retained earnings can
be ascribed to capital gains on foreign operations due to the depreciation of the dollar. As an
illustration, between 1984 and 1987 the increase in the flow of reinvested earnings was $24.6
billion and during the same period the capital appreciation component of foreign-source income
went from a capital loss of $8.4 billion to a capital gain of $15.6 billion, a net increase of $24.0
billion, or 97% of the total increase in retained earnings and 58% of the increase in the overall
outward flow of FDI. The decline in retained earnings from $35.7 billion to $15.2 billion was
largely due to the change in capital gains from $15.6 billion to -$0.1 billion. Figure 3, which
shows outward FDI measured net of capital gains and losses, tells a somewhat different story
about outward FDI in the 1980's, in particular a less dramatic rise from 1984 to 1988. However,
still evident is a large increase in 1986 and 1987 and a decline in 1988 to slightly below the 1986
level.
One further adjustment to the outward FDI data should be made. As it stands now, it
includes transactions between U.S. parent companies and Netherlands Antilles affiliates. Most of
15
these affiliates were established in the late 1970's and early 1980's to borrow funds in European
capital markets and reloan them to their U.S. parents. Due to the U.S. - Netherlands Antilles tax
treaty then in force, this arrangement allowed the avoidance of U.S. withholding taxes. Upon the
elimination of the withholding tax in 1984, this tax advantage was ended. Thus the data show
large debt inflows from the Netherlands Antilles until 1984 and large outflows thereafter, as the
loans are repaid. Figure 3 shows the pattern of outward FDI after purging the data of transactions
with the Netherlands Antilles (and capital gains). The upward trend of the 1980's looks smaller
still, although 1987 still stands out as an all- time record, with 1988 falling back to the 1986 level.
All in all, the post-TRA86 performance of outward FDI has been strong relative to the early
1980's, but not high relative to the late 1970's. This general conclusion is corroborated by other
data on the strength of foreign direct investment. Figure 4 shows the recent history of capital
expenditures by majority-owned foreign affiliates of U.S. companies.15 The figures for 1987 and
earlier represent actual expenditures, while those for 1988 and 1989 represent planned
expenditures from a Bureau of Economic Analysis survey taken in December 1988. Consistent
with the FDI numbers discussed above, this data indicates a surge in capital expenditures after
TRA86. In this case the surge is expected to begin in 1988 rather than in 1987. While 1987
investment was only 5.5% higher than 1986, planned 1989 expenditures are 47.5% higher Than
actual expenditures in 1986. The expected increase is widespread across industry group as well.16
In sum, two distinct sources of data indicate that outward FDI has been strong since the
passage of TRA86. However, the 1988 FDI figure is substantially below the 1987 figure. and as a
percentage of GNP it is below the FDI of the late 1970's. It is particularly difficult to detect the
hand of TRA86 in this performance, since its net impact on the incentive to undertake FDI is
ambiguous on theoretical grounds due to the offsetting incentive effects of several of its aspects.
To detect TRA86's influence, it may be necessary to look at specific aspects of the post-TRA86
FDI performance.
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4.1.1 Geographical Distribution of FDI
Judging by the capital expenditures numbers, the planned increase in investment is broadly
distributed across geographical areas. The overall increase between 1985 and 1989 is, however,
higher for Europe and Japan (49.4% and 47.6%, respectively) compared to Canada and
developing countries (19.1% and 15.7%, respectively). The strong European performance is no
doubt partly stimulated by the planned dismantling of intemal trade barriers, and fear of increased
protectionism, in 1992.
Is there any evidence of a post-TRA86 shift toward investment in low-tax countries? Table
1 assembles some evidence to assess that question. European countries are divided into groups
based on their effective tax rates on investment as calculated by Crooks, et al.(1988). The rate of
growth of capital expenditures in low-tax countries (Belgium, Ireland, and Luxembourg) is notably
higher than in high-tax countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Portugal).17 This conclusion is robust to including as a low-tax country Spain, whose effective
tax rate on new investment was assessed to be relatively high by Crooks et al., but is generally
understood to be a low-tax location for investment. Of course the prospect of reduced internal
trade barriers is an alternative explanation for the growing importance of the relative tax burdens
imposed by host countries. With a reduction in barriers to trade, there is less need to locate
production facilities in the same country as the final market.
4.1.2 Financial and Accounting Responses
In situations where all governments agree on the source of income, the relative decline in
the U.S. statutory rate gave multinationals (especially those in an excess credit situation) more
incentive to have taxable income appear as U.S.-source income rather than foreign-source income.
On the other hand, more U.S. multinationals are in an excess credit position, and in this situation
an increase in foreign-source income for U.S. tax purposes only is advantageous, because it
increases the amount of foreign tax credit that can be taken immediately. Thus the incentive to shift
income between U.S. and foreign sources depends on the relative strength of these factors and
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critically on the relationship between the income source rules of the U.S. and those of the host
countries. Shifting of income can be accomplished through a great variety of financial and
accounting transactions, the net effect of which would be to decrease net taxable income abroad
and the reported rate of return on foreign assets.
Table 2 shows that there is evidence for one dimension of financial response, an increase in
debt transfers from parent to foreign affiliate.'8 In the seven years since 1982 for which this data
has been collected, until 1986 debt outflows had been substantially negative (except for a positive
$187 million in 1982). Since 1986 debt transfers have averaged nearly $3 billion annually. 19 The
evidence for complementary declines in equity transfers is more ambiguous, because although in
1988 equity transfers were at a seven-year low, in 1987 they were at their highest level since 1982.
Note that subsidiary borrowing was made relatively more attractive not only by the reduced U.S.
statutory rate, but also by the one-taxpayer rule for interest allocations of the parent corporation.
Under that rule, the tax saving to a rum in an excess credit situation per dollar of U.S. interest
expense is less than the U.S. statutory rate, because some of the interest must be allocated to
foreign-source income, reducing the available amount of foreign tax credits. Before TRA86, the
interest deduction was fully effective if it was taken by a subsidiary with no foreign-source
income.
As Table 3 indicates, the rate of return on outward investment, calculated net of capital
gains and transactions with Netherlands Antilles affiliates, shows no evidence of a post-TRA86
decline due to the incentive to shift income away from foreign taxable income now subject to
relatively higher statutory tax rates. If anything, the trend is upward.
4.1.3 Timing Issues
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was passed by both houses of the legislature on September
25 and 27, 1986 and signed into law by President Reagan on October 22. That many of the basic
features of TRA86 would become law was widely perceived by May of 1986, when the Senate
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Finance Committee passed its tax bill, although some important details had yet to be decided by the
conference committee.
Most details of the law were scheduled to take effect on January 1, 1987, although the cut
in the corporate tax rate was phased in so that it was 40% in 1987 and 34% for 1988 and
thereafter, and the investment tax credit was eliminated retroactively to January 1, 1986. The
inminent change in the tax law provided corporations with the incentive to accelerate or decelerate
decisions to attract more favorable tax treatment. Reflecting these incentives outward FDI behaved
strikingly in the fourth quarter of 1986 and, to some extent, the first quarter of 1987.
The flow of net outward FDI was extraordinarily low in the fourth quarter of 1986, falling
sharply to -41.1 billion from an average of a $9.1 billion in the first three quarters and $11.2
billion in the first quarter of 1987. Equity transfers were extraordinarily large in both directions,
four times as large as in previous quarters, with decreases exceeding increases. Gross decreases in
equity amounted to $7.1 billion in 1986:4 alone, more than four times the rate of the first three
quarters of 1986. Debt transfers moved from a substantial net outflow to a $0.3 billion inflow.
Dividend repatriations were also unusually high in 1986:4--S10.0 billion, compared to an average
of $4.4 billion in the first three quarters of 1986 and an average of $5.7 billion per quarter in 1987.
There is some indication that the drop in net capital outflows in part reflected a timing change,
because outflows in the first quarter of 1987 were higher than any other period in the six quarters
from 1986:2 to 1987;3.
What could have accounted for the extraordinary drop in net outward capital flows? The
extraordinarily high volume of equity transfers was undoubtedly largely due to the imminent repeal
(as of January 1, 1987) of die General Utilities doctrine (under which a corporation could liquidate
and avoid paying a corporate-level capital gains tax on the sale of its assets) and other changes that
would increase the tax cost of mergers and acquisitions after TRA86. Thus, there was a tax
incentive to accelerate a planned sale or reorganization into 1986:4.
The large volume of dividend repatriations in 1986:4 is an apparent puzzle in view of the
argument made below that there is an incentive to postpone dividends from the high tax rate pre-
TRA86 years to subsequent years when the tax rate would be lower. Dividend repatriations in
1986:4 could have been designed to beat the TRA86 clock concerning separate baskets for the
foreign tax credit. As of 1987, excess credits earned for foreign-source income in certain
categories could no longer be averaged against other kinds of income. By repatriating this income
in 1986, the excess credits could have been of more value to the firm.
There is strong evidence that U.S. multioationals reacted to the declining statutory
corporate rate between 1986 and 1988 by postponing dividend repatriations. Total distributed
earnings jumped from $24.3 billion in 1987 to $37.2 billion in 1988. As a fraction of earnings
before capital gains or losses dividend payments rose from 57.4% to 70.8%.20 The fact that the
1986 payout rate was even higher, at 69.9%, largely reflects the extraordinarily high distributions
in the fourth quarter of that year.
4.2 Inward Investment
As Figure 5 shows, foreign direct investment into the U.S. has surged since the passage of
TRA86. Inward FDI totalled $46.9 billion in 1987 and $58.4 billion in 1988, compared to an
average of only $20.9 billion in the 1980-6 period. This statement needs less qualification than the
earlier one about outward investment, because capital gains have not been as important and because
intrafinn transactions with financial affiliates in the Netherlands Antilles are not an impontant issue.
Also in contrast to outward investment, retained earnings have, with the exception of 1988. been
negligible. Equity transfers dominate the new investment, comprising over two-thirds of the
capital inflows in 1987-8.
This post-TRA86 surge is corroborated by the data on investment outlays for U.S.
business enterprises acquired or established by foreign direct investors. This series differs from
the equity transfer component of the FDI series because it excludes infusions (or reductions) of
equity into existing affiliates and because it does not net out sales or liquidations of U.S.
enterprises by foreign investors. As Figure 6 shows, this series was marked by large growth from
1985 to 1986 and again from 1987 to 1988, putting the 1988 total at $65.0 billion, or six times the
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1982-4 annual average. The total assets of U.S. businesses acquired or established also surged in
1986 and 1987, leveling off in 1988 to a level three times the 1984-5 average.
4.2.1 Geographic Distribution
Table 4 breaks down inward FDI by country of origin. Shown are the flow of FDI as well
as outlays for acquisition or establishment of U.S. business enterprises by nonbank U.S. affiliates
of foreign corporations. For the former, investments are classified by the country of the foreign
parent. For the latter, investments are classified by the country of "ultimate beneficial owner,"
which is that person, proceeding up a U.S. affiliate's ownership chain, beginning with and
including the foreign parent, that is not owned more than 50 percent by another person.
Although most investing countries participated in the post-TRA86 surge in investment, the
increase was dominated by investment from Japan and the United Kingdom. These two countries
account for about three-quarters of the 1985-8 increase in FDI and outlays by foreigners for
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acquisition or establishment of U.S. business enterprises.
The recent predominance of FDI from Japan and the United Kingdom is consistent with the
Scholes-Wolfson hypothesis, because they are two countries that effectively operate a worldwide
tax system with a foreign tax credit, and their resident multinationals may be relatively less affected
by increases in the U.S. tax burden on investment. To some extent, the large rate of increase of
FDI from Japan and the United Kingdom may simply reflect the worldwide increase in FDI from
these countries.22 Worldwide FDI from U.K. (measured in pounds) did increase by 149%
between 1984 and 1988, but this large growth rate is still below the rate of increase in FDI located
in the U.S. Worldwide FDI from Japan (measured in dollars) doubled between 1986 and 1988,
though the share going to the U.S. did increase over this period. Although this pattern is
consistent with the Scholes-Wolfson hypothesis, the qualifications that must accompany its
applicability are so important that I believe it is too early to accept their tax story as the principal




The decreased U.S. corporate tax rate should reduce the incentive of foreign multinationals
to locate debt in the U.S., and more generally to induce them to have taxable income show up as
U.S. source. Figure 5 shows that the former effect is indeed evident in 1988, when the ratio of
equity transfers to debt transfers reached 3.5, the highest ratio since these data were tabulated in
1980.
Table 5 indicates that the rate of return on inward FDI did in fact increase substantially
between 1986 and 1988. Since 1982 only 1984 shows a higher overall return, and for the
manufacturing sector the 1988 rate of return is the highest since 1980. Although this evidence is
consistent with the increased incentive of foreign multinationals to have income reported as U.S.
source, the bottom row of Table S indicates that between 1986 and 1988 there was also an increase
in the rate of return for domestic manufacturing as a whole. It is too early to know to what extent
the increased rate of return on inward FDI merely reflects the increased profitability of all U.S.
located firms.
4.2.3 Timing
As was the case for outward investment, inward FDI in the fourth quarter of 1986 behaved
differently than it had in the quarters before or after. Capital inflows, which averaged an annual
rate of $28.7 billion in the adjacent four quarters, totalled $16.3 billion in 1986:4 alone. Compared
to an average of the adjacent four quarters, both net debt and equity inflows were two and a half
times higher. Not only were the net equity inflows unusually large, but so also were gross equity
flows (both increases and decreases). Much of the extraordinary activity in the fourth quarter of
1986 was probably pulled forward from the first half of 1987, because capital inflows, and
particularly equity inflows, were significantly lower in the first half compared to the second half of
1987. As discussed above in the case of outward investment, the extraordinary behavior of 1986:4




acquisitions, which accelerated sales and reorganizations planned for 1987, and perhaps beyond,
into 1986.
5. Conclusions
There is no question that multinationals' decision-makers took notice of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986. The extraordinary increase in the fourth quarter of 1986 of debt and equity flows as
well as acquisitions was certainly due to the attempt to beat the January 1, 1987 expiration date of
certain favorable tax provisions. A significant but unknown fraction of this extraordinary activity
probably would otherwise have taken place in 1987 or 1988.
That TRA86 affected the timing of activity seems indisputable. But what of its permanent
effect on FDI and its financing? This is, after all, a more interesting issue than the precise timing
of investment. This is a more difficult question to answer, because with less than three years of
post-TRA86 data it is impossible to distinguish the tax explanation from other competing
hypotheses. For example, the strength of inward FDI may be due to the decline in foreigners' rate
of taxation relative to U.S. corporations, but it may also be the lagged response to the cheap dollar
that, according to Froot and Stein (1989), enriches foreigners and thereby lowers their cost of
raising capital. Moreover, the theory does not offer a clear guide to expectations, since the various
provisions often have offsetting incentive effects.
The impact of TRA86 may be more transparent when the patterns of FDI are examined
more closely. .,ince TRA86, the growth rate of outward FDI (actual and planned) into low-tax
countries has greatly exceeded the growth rate of FDI into high-tax countries, behavior which is
consistent with expectations. Furthermore, the location of multinationals' debt finance has moved
away from the U.S. to other countries, also as theory would predict. Observed trends in the rate
of retum to inward FDI are also consistent with tax incentives, although this is not clear in the case
of outward FDI.
All of the analysis of this paper has been conditioned on an assumption that foreign tax
systems do not change in response to TRA86. As John Whalley's paper for this conference makes
clear, this may not be entirely true. The cross-border fungibility of taxable income was
undoubtedly a prime motivation for Canada's reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate. Other
countries have also moved toward a lower-rate, lower-allowance system. Such parallel changes,
and the prospect of further parallel changes, would dampen the magnitude of the economic
responses discussed here. In this case the lasting effect of TRA86 will be the induced change in
the intemational system of taxation as much as changed pattems of cross-border flows of capital.
Although the evidence is often consistent with the changes in incentives due to TRA86, it
does not establish that TRA86 has caused behavior to change. Less than three years of evidente
cannot support such a claim. The preliminary evidence is, though, in line with other research
documenting multinationals' responses to taxation, both with respect to financial behavior (lines
and Hubbard, forthcoming) and real investment behavior (Slemrod, forthcoming).
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Table I
Capital Expenditures by Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Companies,
By Low-Tax and High-Tax Countries in Europe, 1984-1989 ($ millions)
% Increase
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1985-9
Low-Tax 767 778 1054 1160 1417 1672 114.9
Low-Tax Plus
Spain 1234 1193 1505 1793 2253 2653 122.4
High-Tax 6836 7187 8385 7928 9306 10424 45.0
Low-tax European countries: Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg
High-tax countries: Denmark, France, Germany. Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal
Table 4
FDI Inflows and Outlays for Acquisition or Establishment of a U.S. Business
Enterprise by Country of Origin, 1983-1988 ($ millions)






1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
-201 774 30 1017 2471 962
1007 1291 2292 1982 3150 2306
1653 4374 3794 7268 7504 17838
2778 3520 2776 4374 8293 4766
3727 6882 4665 10827 22444 18774
11946 25359 19022 34091 46894 58435
Source; SurvCy of Current Business. various issues.
TotalTable 2
Debt and Equity Outflows, Net of Transactions with the Netherlands Antilles,
1982-1988 ($ millions)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
187 -6127 -3118 -2881 3628 2428 2818
5535 3492 365 -1350 -195 5020 -2944
Outlays for Acquisition or Establishment of a U.S. Business Enterprise (S millions)
Debt
Equity
Source: SuyeY of Current Business. various issues.
Table 3
Rate of Return on Outward Foreign Investment, 1981-88
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
10.2 11.5 7.8 14.4 12.8 12.6 13.0 15.2
Source: Author's calculation using figures from Survey of Current Business, various issues.








1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
295 330 754 2491 2044 3753
584 685 2270 1351 4664 1375
392 1806 1152 -5416 7006 14166
492 562 771 4700 391 1937
2366 3714 6732 8572 15142 21520
8091 15197 23106 39177 40310 65019




Rate of Return on inward FDI and Domestic Manufacturing, 1977.1988
Figure 1








1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
8.7 10.9 12.7 15.6 9.4 2.6 4.3 6.1 3.5 2.7 3.9 5.6
6.8 7.4 8.1 11.0 3.4 0.0 1.8 4.9 0.4 0.1 4.6 6.6
13.4 17.3 22.7 29.6 22.3 13.8 9.2 12.8 8.0 1.1 7.3 8.3
a a a a a 0.1 5.8 11.6 9.0 4.7 5.6 5.8
a a a a a 1.9 4.2 2.4 2.0 4.6 1.3 3.6










alndusnry classification is not comparable to later years.
Source: For FDI, Survey of Current Business, various issues..
For domestic manufacturing, Economic Report of the President, 1989, Table B-91
(1988 number is an average over the first three quarters)
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Outward Foreign Direct Investment. Adjusted for Capital Gains and














"---------Outflows Net of Capital Gains
-"------Outflows Net of Capital Gains and
Transactions with the Netherlands
Antilles
Note: Breakdown of transfers of funds into debt and equity is available only from 1982 on.
Source: Survey of Current Business, various issues. Source: Survey of Current Business, various issues.
Note; Capital gains are not available separately before 1980.
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Figure 4
Capital Expenditures by Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates of V.S. Companies, 1977-1989
Figure 5
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Note; Dreakdown of transfers of funds into debt and equity is available only from 1980 on.






















1 By statute. Canada and West Germany have a worldwide system of taxation. However, their tax
treaties with the U.S. provide that repatriated dividends are generally subject to no further tax
liability.
2 See Slemrod (1989) for a framework for measuring the effective tax rate on a foreign direct
investment by a multinational firm.
3The income of foreign branches of U.S. corporations is taxed as accrued. Partly for tax reasons,
most foreign activity of U.S. corporations is carried out by subsidiaries rather than branches.
4The depreciation rules used in the calculation of earnings and profits do, however, change. For
example, since 1980 the depreciation rules that apply to property used overseas have been made
less generous. These schedules have tax implications because they affect the calculation of tar.
deemed paid by subsidiaries to foreign governments and the amount of foreign tax credit
available, for any given amount of dividends remitted.
5Since the passage of TRA86, many other countries have enacted tax reforms which share some of
the corporate-rate-reducing, base-broadening aspects of TRA86. To the extent that TRA86caused these reforms (or increased their likelihood), the host country effective tax rate was
influenced by the U.S. tax reform. The analysis that follows holds constant the foreign tax
system.
6The average tax rate paid to foreign governments is subject to a degree of control by the
multinational via its repatriation policy. By repatriating in.-me primarily from high-tax
countries, the average tax rate on its foreign-source income is high and less likely to attract
additional U.S. tax liability.
7 llartman (1984) has argued that, regardless of the excess credit status of the U.S. parent, the
level of repatriation tax is irrelevant for the incentive to undertake FDI financed by earnings of the
foreign subsidiary. This is because the repatriation tax reduces equally both the return to
investment and the opportunity cost of investment (reduced dividends). This argument would
not apply to the infusion of new equity capital from the parent. See Jun (1989) for a critique of
this view.
8Grubert and Mutti (1987) quote U.S. Treasury estimates that the fraction of manufacturing
multinationals (weighted by worldwide income) in excess credit would increase from 20% to
69%. Goodspeed and Frisch (1989), using updated corporate tax return information, estimate
that the fraction of foreign-source income subject to excess credits would rise from 50% to 78%,
and from 32% to 82% in manufacturing. These calculations, however, consider only the change
in statutory rate and do not consider changes in the allocation rules or the separate baskets,
discussed below. In addition, neither analysis considers changes, perhaps induced by the U.S.
reform, in other countries' tax rates. Perhaps most importantly, the analyses do not take into
account any behavioral response of the multinationals.
90f course, Hartman's argument implies that, for investment financed by retained earnings, only
the host country's tax rate matters even for firms in an excess limitation position, so that no post-
TRA86 increased sensitivity to host country tax rates should be observed.
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Source: Survey of Current Business. various issues.
' ' 34
10The one-taxpayer rule already effectively applied to the allocation of expenses on research and
development.
This analysis presumes that the interest allocation rules of foreign governments have not
changed.
12This would happen if the parent loaned money to its affiliate, which in turn declared an
equivalent dividend to its parent or returned equity capital to the parent. It would not appear this
way if the change was effected by parallel transactions with a bank, i.e. a simultaneous bank
loan to the affiliate and a repayment of principal by the parent company. In this case no change
in foreign direct investment would be indicated by the data.
'3 Grubetn and Mutti (1989a) discovered this phenomenon in a cross-sectional analysis, observing.
a highly significant negative relationship between the reported after-tax rate of profit for U.S.
mtultinationals' subsidiaries and the host country's statutory corporate tax rate. This observation
is consistent with the successful shifting of taxable income from high-tax countries to low-tax
countries. By analogy, a reduction in the U.S. statutory rate relative to foreign rates would be
associated with a decline in the rate of return on foreign-source income.
14 Note that the measure of FDI used in Figure 2 is equal to net transfers of funds (debt and equity)
from the parent to foreign affiliates plus earnings retained by the affiliates. Thus it is a financial
flow rather than a real investment concept. For example, an investment of a foreign subsidiary
that is financed by funds raised by the subsidiary from third parties would not be counted as
Fnl.
15For affiliates other than those engaged in natural resource exploration an'd development, capital
expenditures include all expenditures made to acquire, add to, or improve properties, plant, and
equipment. For affiliates engaged in natural resource exploration and development, capital
expenditures also include the full amount of exploration and development expenditures (whether
capitalized or expensed). Capital expenditures are on a gross basis; sales and other dispositions
of assets are not netted against them.
i
6 The difference in timing could be due to the accumulation of funds in 1987 in anticipation of
capital expenditures to take place beginning in 1988.
'I7e United .Lingdom is included in neither the low-tax nor high-tax group because, according to
Crooks fdi., its effective tax rate lies between the two groups and because the U.K. corporate
tax system was undergoing rapid and fundamental changes over this period.
18The relatively low U.S. statutory rate gives an incentive to have debt held by the foreign
subsidiary (in a high-tax country) compared to the U.S. parent, as long as the foreign
government allows the subsidiary's interest deductions. Such a shift need not be accomplished
by increased parent-to-subsidiary lending, but also by increased subsidiary borrowing from
third parties. However, the interest allocation rules of TRA86 favored parent-to-subsidiary
lending for finns in arexcess credit position. This is because the interest receipts of the parent
are considered foreign-source income but only a fraction of the parent's interest expenses would
be deducted against foreign-source income, thus increasing net foreign-source income the the
limit on the amount of foreign taxes that can be credited. This tax benefit in many cases more
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than offset the withholding tax on interest paid by the subsidiary. The IRS has proposed a
regulation which, by requiring interest payments of the parent to be netted against interest
received from subsidiaries before being subject to the allocation rules, would eliminate the
advantage of parent-to-subsidiary lending.
'9 Note that these figures are all net of transactions with Netherlands Antilles affiliates.
20The change looks even more striking if dividends are expressed as a fraction of earnings
including capital gains or losses, increasing from 41.5% in 1987 to 71.0% in 1988.
To some extent tax-induced changes in the timing of dividend repatriations may not be reflected
in the data. For example, subpart F rules treat certain kinds of income of subsidiaries as if they
were remitted dividends, even if no dividends are actually paid (and therefore no withholding
taxes are due to the foreign government).
2 1The increase in United Kingdom activity would appear even larger if the measure of FDI was the
change in a country's FDI position, which differs from capital inflows by including valuation
adjustments that arise, for example, due to the transfer in ownership of a FDI from one owner to
another. In 1988, a large holding in Shell Oil was transferred from a Dutch holding company to
the British parent.
2 2 The impact of the U.S. tax system on investment from the U.K. is especially difficult to son out
because during this period there were major changes in the structure of U.K. corporate taxes.
In the 1984 budget the corporate rate was reduced from 52% to 35% by 1987 and generous
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